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More than half of the EU budget is dedicated to Structural Funds, which are allocated across EU regions
with the aim of promoting economic and social development. Lisa Dellmuth, Michael Stoffel and
Dominik Schraff write that the use of decentralised authorities to allocate structural funding can
create substantive problems for the EU’s policy goals. They illustrate that the distribution of funds
often reflects local political concerns, with districts that support the regional government’s party
receiving disproportionate shares of funding.
Since 2000, more than €500 billion in Structural Funds have been channelled to local projects in
the EU Member States via various national intermediary institutions. These intermediaries, typically
government ministries at the regional level, select and monitor local projects. The reallocation of
Structural Funds across local projects by regional governments has been surrounded by
considerable controversy in recent years.
Much academic research, including an article by Jens Blom-Hansen, has focused on the extent to
which regional governments use EU Structural Funds for their own interests, but these studies are
typically limited to one or a few recipient regions, thereby potentially causing biased findings. In two
recent articles, one by Dellmuth and Stoffel and the other by Schraff, we seek to fill this gap in the
academic literature. We conducted the first two large-n studies of the causal link between EU
funding goals, political distortions through regional governments’ electoral concerns, and the local
allocation of Structural Funds. Our statistical results suggest that the distributive choices of recipient
regional governments are largely in accordance with EU goals, but that regional governments
nevertheless use EU Structural Funds to reward electorally-mobilised government strongholds.
Regional governments’ discretion in selecting local projects
The Structural Funds are allocated within the framework
of the EU’s financial perspective, which specifies
expenditure ceilings and eligibility criteria for regions for
a period of seven years. The amount of funding each
region receives in the course of a seven-year period is
fixed at the beginning of the financial perspective.
Subsequently, regional governments invest Structural
Funds in local projects across a large range of areas,
such as transport, business development and
communications infrastructure.
Regional governments enjoy a large amount of
discretion in selecting local projects. The procedure of
payment takes place as follows. After financing projects
in advance, regional governments submit aggregated
statements of expenditure to the European Commission
several times a year. The Commission then reimburses
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regional expenses. In this process, the Commission can confirm or amend the rate of Structural Funds assistance in
order to ensure that the projects receive the resources needed for their achievement without the beneficiaries
acquiring any unjustified advantage, for example through a distortion of market conditions.
According to EU treaties, the Commission can penalise sub-state governments by cutting back the amount of
funding, in the case of irregularities or ineligible expenditures, as explained in a European Court of Auditors’ 2008
Report. Despite the Commission’s supervisory role, however, regional governments retain significant discretion in
choosing projects, as the legal framework does not provide clear-cut eligibility criteria for projects.
Motives and behaviour of regional governments in allocating funds locally
We examined the motives and behaviour of regional governments in allocating Structural Funds across 419 German
local districts during the period 2000-2006. Germany makes an excellent case study for an inquiry into the political-
economic process culminating in the local allocation of EU Structural Funds, as Länder (German state)
governments are popularly elected. Our analysis yields three main results.
First, regional governments allocate Structural Funds across local districts largely in accordance with needs-based
criteria, as specified in the EU regulatory framework. The bulk of the Structural Funds are spent to alleviate
structural problems related to urbanisation, high unemployment and lagging economic performance.
Second, Länder governments spend more EU funds in local districts where the vote share of the regional Prime
Minister’s party is high. Furthermore, poor districts receive more special interest spending than rich districts
because regional policy-makers assume that they will receive more votes per euro invested in poor than in rich
districts (see Figure 1 below).
Figure 1: Marginal effect of vote share for state prime minister’s party on local funding per capita
Note: The solid lines show how the effect of support for the state prime minister’s party on
the spending of EU funds varies depending on the unemployment rate and GDP per capita of
districts. In other words, in addition to it being more likely that EU funds will go to districts
with high levels of support for the state prime minister’s party, it is also more likely that of
these districts, those with high unemployment/low GDP per capita will receive particularly
high levels of EU spending. The shaded area shows 90 per cent confidence intervals. Source:
Dellmuth and Stoffel
Third, regional governments allocate more EU funds across stronghold areas where electoral turnout is high. That
is, they use differences in the level of electoral mobilisation to make distributive decisions among their many core
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constituencies (see Figure 2 below).
Figure 2: Average marginal effect of vote share for state prime minister’s party on EU funding by turnout
Note: Similar to Figure 1, the dark line shows how the effect of support for the state prime
minister’s party on EU funding changes relative to turnout within districts. The higher the
turnout within a district, the more pronounced the effect. The lighter lines show 90 per cent
confidence intervals.  Source: Schraff
Controversy over the decentralisation of EU Structural Funds
The extent to which our results will generalise to other countries is uncertain, and further studies that cover more
countries will tell us how far they hold. However, we expect to find similar political distortions in local EU funds
allocations in other Member States with popularly elected regional governments, such as Spain or the UK.
The German case adds new insights to an ongoing controversy about the design of EU Structural Funds which
pivots around the question of how much discretion should be granted to Member States in reallocating Structural
Funds locally. Our results clearly show that the decentralisation of EU structural policy comes at a cost. Regional
governments may use their discretion to reward core voters, potentially undermining EU funding goals.
This, in turn, may help explain why many studies, including an article by Lebre de Freitas et al, find little correlation
between Structural Funds transfers and desirable changes in macroeconomic indicators. Future discussions about
the design of EU structural policy are likely to revolve around the trade-off between the benefits of a decentralised
allocation of Structural Funds and the costs arising from a relatively non-transparent allocation process and
potential political distortion. A crucial question that EU citizens and policy-makers have to answer for themselves is:
Do we want to bear these costs, and, if so, to what extent?
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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